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Abstract  
(113 words) 
The importance of developing a better understanding of positive emotion regulation in 
both healthy and clinical populations is now recognised. This special edition brings together 
leading figures in the positive emotion regulation field and has contributions characterizing 
positive phenomena, differentiating them from negative phenomena, and evaluating 
underlying psychological mechanisms that drive these phenomena. This commentary reviews 
these articles to highlight challenges and opportunities for this emerging field, including the 
need to standardise the measures of positive constructs, to evaluate more robustly underlying 
mechanisms, to be more explicit about how the links between negative and positive 
phenomena are conceptualised, and to ensure that these scientific findings lead to meaningful 
changes in real-world policy and practice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emotion regulation is the variety of processes used to change the nature, frequency 
and intensity of emotion experience (Gross, 2015). Historically, basic science and clinical 
research have focused on understanding the consequences of emotion regulation strategies 
that aim to modulate negative feelings and how these may impact on psychopathology. 
However, more recently, there has been an increasing recognition that the regulation of 
positive feelings is also important (Bryant, Chadwick, & Kluwe, 2011; Carl, Soskin, Kerns, 
& Barlow, 2013; Quoidbach, Mikolajczak, & Gross, 2015; Hofmann, Sawyer, Fang & 
Asnaani, 2012). Understanding how to modulate positive emotions in a context appropriate 
fashion could not only increase levels of wellbeing in the general population but also lead to 
better outcomes for clinical disorders characterized by abnormalities in positive affect 
regulation. These include those conditions characterized by reduced positive affect 
(anhedonia), such as depression, social phobia and schizophrenia (e.g., Dunn, 2012; Dunn & 
Roberts, 2016; Kashdan, Weeks, & Savostyanova, 2011; Watson & Naragon-Gainey, 2010) 
and those conditions characterized by elevated positive affect, such as the manic phase of 
bipolar disorder (e.g., Gruber, 2011).  
The special edition brings together leading basic science and clinical researchers in 
this emerging field in an effort to improving understanding and treatment of positive emotion 
regulation in psychopathology. This commentary on the special edition will use the articles in 
the special edition to highlight challenges and opportunities for the field of positive emotion 
regulation and to suggest some future directions of travel. It will in turn focus on: how best to 
operationalize positive constructs; whether positive and negative phenomena are best 
characterized as orthogonal to one other; how to characterise underlying psychological 
mechanisms driving positive change; how to measure positive change; and finally how to 
ensure key findings are translated into meaningful changes to policy and practice. 
  
Characterizing positive phenomena 
Many of the articles in this special edition represent good illustrations of how to pay 
the same degree of attention to positive phenomena that has historically been paid to negative 
phenomena. The study by Gruber and colleagues illustrates the benefits of a fine grained 
characterisation of positive (and negative) emotions in terms of differentiating between risk 
for mania and depression (Gruber et al., 2016). In a sample of outpatient adolescents, higher 
self reported joy and contempt were uniquely associated with mania symptoms (over and 
above depression symptoms). In contrast, low levels of joy and high sadness were uniquely 
linked to depression (over and above mania symptoms). This is interesting on a number of 
levels. First, it demonstrates the importance of balance in affective experience. In particular, 
the same emotion (joy) was linked to mania at high levels and depression at low levels, 
presumably indicating that a moderate level of joy is associated with optimal wellbeing. 
Second, it illustrates that blends of positive and negative emotion can most helpfully 
distinguish between symptoms of different forms of psychopathology. What would now be 
interesting to explore is whether similar patterns of affective disturbance are linked to 
psychopathology across the life span (adolescence, adulthood and older age) and whether 
these patterns change with chronicity (first onset versus repeat episodes). For example, it is 
conceivable that repeated experience of the detrimental consequences of a manic state could 
mean that in mania individuals increasingly come to fear positive emotions (e.g. Edge et al., 
2013) so elevated joy may be a less significant marker of bipolar disorder with chronicity.  
It is also important to characterize positive phenomena beyond mere affect, including 
positive cognition and positive behaviour. The study by Rice and Fredrickson (2016) in this 
special edition demonstrates how spontaneous positive thoughts are more likely to occur for 
things towards which we feel harmonious passion (those that we internalize autonomously 
and that are not in conflict with other roles we hold; Vallerand et al., 2003). Further, these 
spontaneous positive thoughts make it more likely that behaviour consistent with this passion 
will be adopted. This study has parallels with an existing literature on spontaneous memories 
and prospection that has long recognised that individuals tend to have spontaneous 
remembrances of positive events in the past and spontaneous imaginings of a positive future 
(e.g., Bernsten & Jacobsen, 2008). These experiences are more likely to emerge in situations 
that are low in attentional demands, are often prompted or triggered  by an environmental 
cue, tend to have a high degree of distinctiveness and specificity, and lead to a distinct impact 
on mood (see Bernston, 2007 for a review). Interestingly, imaginings of the future tend to be 
more positive and idealistic than remembrances of the past (Bernsten & Jacobsen, 2008). 
Moreover, in the clinical domain the characteristics of positive and negative intrusive 
memories have begun to be contrasted (Moulds, Williams, Grishma & Nickerson, 2012). It 
will be important for future work to delineate the extent to which positive spontaneous 
thought is a distinct process, rather than one which overlaps with positive mental time travel 
to the personal past or future. There is potential for developing novel intervention techniques 
that capitalise on these insights, for example encouraging clients who struggle to experience 
positive phenomena to place themselves in situations that maximise the likelihood of 
spontaneous positive thought occurring.  
 There is also likely to be an interaction between these positive feelings, cognitions 
and behaviours and the environment, which could be capitalised on therapeutically. 
Interesting in this regard is the study by Disabato and colleagues in the special edition, which 
demonstrates that possessing particular personality strengths (gratitude and meaning in life) 
makes individuals more likely to experience subsequent positive life events (Disabato, 
Kashdan, Short & Jarden, 2016). The authors argue that these personality strengths motivated 
individuals to engage in behaviours that make the positive life events more likely to occur 
(for example, promoting prosocial behaviours that lead to subsequent rewards). Surprisingly, 
these increases in positive life events only mediated the association between these personality 
strengths and improvement in depression symptoms over three (but not six) months. The 
authors explain this in terms of hedonic adaptation, such that over time the same activities no 
longer generate the same degree of positive affect (Diener et al., 2006). However, this 
account would only logically hold if the individuals were completing identical or very similar 
positive activities across the six month period. It seems likely that individuals to some extent 
vary their repertoire of positive activities over time. Either way, it is interesting to have 
linked the concept of the hedonic treadmill to the outcomes of positive activity scheduling. 
This has implications for the delivery of treatments like Behavioural Activation (where the 
central intervention techniques are overcoming avoidance and scheduling positive activities) 
to bolster positive affect. While behavioural activation approaches have been shown to 
bolster wellbeing (Mazzucchelli, Kane & Rees, 2010), there is clearly room for improvement. 
It may be helpful to encourage individuals explicitly to build in variety to the activities they 
schedule to minimise hedonic adaptation, which reduces the potency of these activities to 
build positive mood over time.  
 Finally, the study by Coughlan, Tata & MacLeod (2016) demonstrates how a positive 
outlook may not always be beneficial, in this instance in the prospective domain. They 
examine why deliberately self-harming individuals tend to remain over-invested in goals they 
believe are unattainable (a processing style that exacerbates distress in the longer term).  One 
possible explanation is that individuals who self harm focus on the degree of wellbeing they 
will feel should they achieve the goal, rather than on the steps needed to complete the goal 
(cf. Oettingen, 2012). As expected, the study found that the deliberate self-harm group had 
significantly lower levels of current well-being than a control group. However, there was no 
difference between the groups when predicting their future well-being if they attained 
positive future goals (i.e. imagined goal attainment). This study is part of a broader literature 
highlighting the potency (for better and for worse) of prospection (Roepke & Seligman, 
2016). There is an increasing focus in interventions on modifying prospection instead of or as 
well as memory, for example Future Directed Thinking (Vilhauer, 2014) 
 In summary, the articles in the special edition demonstrate how positive affective, 
cognitive and behavioural phenomena in both clinical and non-clinical groups may be 
characterized more precisely. This is the first critical step in correcting disturbances in 
positivity seen in psychopathology.  
Characterizing the interrelationship between positive and negative emotion regulation 
 Perhaps the key challenge for the positive emotion regulation field is to reach 
consensus about how to integrate with the large body of work looking at negative emotion 
regulation. A number of articles in the special edition directly speak to this issue or are 
implicitly influenced by it.  
Johnson and Wood (2016) review how the positive psychology movement emerged as 
a counter-point to the pathological focus in classic clinical psychology. They argue that this 
has led to an unhelpful fractionation of the field, partly driven by market pressures, into 
seeing ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ phenomena as distinct from one another. They convincingly 
argue that what are instead needed are conceptual frameworks and intervention products that 
simultaneously aim to reduce the negative and build the positive – referred to as a ‘positive 
clinical psychology’ approach (Wood & Tarrier, 2010). It is difficult to disagree with this 
analysis in its moderate form (see also Hofman et al., 2012; Hofmann, 2016).   
 Johnson and Wood go further than this, however, to make the claim that positive and 
negative constructs should universally be conceptualised as lying at opposite ends of the 
same continuum. This is a more controversial argument. If true, this has potentially important 
clinical implications, since it would suggest that the same intervention approaches should be 
both able to reduce negative and increase positive mood. There are some challenges to the 
stronger form of this argument, however. For example, the fact that individuals report being 
able to experience ambivalent emotional experience (simultaneously experiencing positive 
and negative emotions at the same time and sometimes to the same object; e.g. Corradi, 2013; 
Rees, Rothman, Lehavy & Sanchez-Burks, 2013), cannot easily be accounted for by continua 
arguments.  Moreover, there is emerging evidence that manipulating the same underlying 
psychological mechanism can increase both positive and negative emotion experience. For 
example, the tendency to be aware of sensory and bodily experience (‘observing’) has been 
associated with mixed outcomes in the mindfulness literature, such that it is linked to 
increases in wellbeing and in levels of psychopathology (e.g. Baer et al., 2013; Williams, 
Dalgleish, Karl & Kuyken, 2015). One explanation is that this tendency to observe serves as a 
global (positive and negative) affective amplifier. Such an explanation is hard to reconcile 
with a view that positive and negative emotions are on opposite ends of the same continuum 
(as increasing one should decrease the other). Of course, there are other possible accounts 
(for example, that the ‘observing’ mechanism plays out differently as a function of meditation 
experience; Williams, Dalgleish, Karl & Kuyken, 2014). 
The continuum perspective can be contrasted to views that positive and negative are 
at least partly orthogonal constructs. In affective neuroscience, the case has been made that 
the systems that drive approach to rewarding stimuli (associated with positive affect) are to 
some extent dissociable from those that drive withdrawal from punishing stimuli (associated 
with negative affect) (Watson, Clark & Tellegen; Grey; BIS/BAS). In the sociology 
literature, the case has been made that illbeing is largely independent from wellbeing, such 
that it is possible to experience pockets of wellbeing even in the midst of illbeing (Keyes, 
2005). Of course, a hybrid position is possible, so that some positive and negative phenomena 
lie on opposite ends of single continuum (and are driven by common underlying 
psychological mechanisms), whereas other positive and negative phenomena may be 
genuinely distinct. In many ways this is an optimistic message for healthcare, for example 
suggesting that clients suffering from chronic physical health conditions (high in illbeing) 
may still experience intervals of wellbeing. Moreover, it opens the door to a personalized 
medicine approach, such that individuals high in illbeing may benefit from one kind of 
treatment approach, whereas those characterised by low wellbeing may benefit from an 
entirely different treatment. Emerging analytical techniques have the potential to match the 
right patient to the right treatment in this way, for example the work on the personalized 
advantage index by DeRubeis and colleagues (DeRubeis et al., 2014).  
The way in which the interrelationships between positive and negative phenomena are 
conceptualised can substantively alter interpretation of studies.  For example, the interesting 
study by Trompetter, Keline & Bohlmeijer (2016) in this special edition provides cross-
sectional support for the importance of developing self-compassion in both reducing 
psychopathology and increased positive mental health. This is part of an exciting emerging 
literature on the beneficial effects of cultivating self-compassion (for reviews, see Strauss et 
al., in press; Leaviss & Uttley, 2015). How the Trompetter et al data are interpreted critically, 
however, depends on the implicit underpinning conceptualisation of how positive and 
negative phenomena interrelate. The authors arguably are viewing mental health (‘positive’ 
phenomena) and psychopathology (‘negative’ phenomena) as conceptually separable 
constructs, given that they argue mental health drives reduced psychopathology. However, if 
increased positive mental health and decreased psychopathology are simply two ends of the 
same underlying continuum (and so are measuring the same underlying construct), it is 
unsurprising that when one end of the continuum is partialled out the other end of the 
continuum is no longer linked to compassion. It is not possible for cross-sectional data of this 
kind to differentiate between these alternative explanations, so there is a need for further 
work using different methodological approaches to distinguish between them. 
The choice of underlying conceptual framework can also influence the design of 
interventions, potentially impacting on the eventual efficacy of the treatment. For example, 
the Chaves, Lopez-Gomez, Hervas & Vazques (2016) study in this special edition report 
results of an interesting controlled trial contrasting the benefits of group cognitive 
behavioural therapy to a bespoke positive psychology group programme, finding both 
treatments were comparably partially effective for treating depression. From a perspective 
that positive and negative phenomena are to some extent orthogonal it could be argued that it 
is not surprising that there was no clear difference between these treatments (and that both 
did not lead to optimal recovery). The CBT group would be expected to target repairing 
elevations in negative affect. The bespoke positive psychology group would be expected to 
target repairing reductions in positive affect. To lead to full recovery, both of these would 
need to be treated by a single intervention. From this vantage point, it would be interesting 
for this study to be repeated with a third treatment arm that simultaneously targets repairing 
positive and negative affect, with the hypothesis being that this would be superior to both of 
the other treatments. However, a note of caution is required here. There was no evidence of 
superiority of CBT over the positive group at repairing negative affect constructs and nor was 
there any evidence of superiority of the positive group over CBT at repairing positive affect.  
In summary, it is likely to be helpful for the field going forwards if studies are explicit 
about their underlying theoretical conceptualisation of how positive and negative affect 
systems are interrelated.  
Characterizing the psychological mechanisms underpinning positive phenomena 
The focus of many of the articles in this special edition is to characterize what 
underlying psychological mechanisms drive alterations in positive phenomena. The thrust of 
the Trompetter et al (2016) study discussed above is that increases in positive mental health 
lead to reductions in psychopathology, which is mediated by an increase in self-compassion. 
However, the authors also acknowledge that the reverse mediation holds, meaning that the 
cultivation of self-compassion is likely to be a promising approach to build positive mental 
health.   
Jazaieri, Goldin and Gross (2016) examine whether changes in two forms of emotion 
regulation – expression suppression and reappraisal – account for the beneficial effects of 
CBT for social phobia on life satisfaction measures in a randomized controlled trial. As 
expected, the CBT arm showed a greater increase in reappraisal and life satisfaction, relative 
to a wait list control group. Unexpectedly, CBT did not lead to a greater reduction in 
expression suppression in the CBT relative to the control condition. The degree of change in 
reappraisal in the CBT arm was not significantly related to change in life satisfaction. 
However, greater decrease in expression suppression did correlate with a greater increase in 
life satisfaction. It is difficult to interpret the lack of a significant correlation between 
reappraisal change and life satisfaction change. It may be that reappraisal change is genuinely 
unrelated to life satisfaction change (i.e. is not an active mechanism of the therapy). 
Alternatively, it could be that there was insufficient variability in reappraisal change to be 
able to meaningfully predict individual differences in life satisfaction change. This study also 
demonstrates some of the challenges in trying to establish mechanism of action in a therapy. 
Change in each emotion regulation mechanism and the life satisfaction outcome variable 
were calculated over identical time scales, meaning that the temporal precedent criterion 
necessary to establish mediation is not met (cf. Kramer, Wilson, Fairburn & Agras, 2002). A 
more powerful design would have been to assess early change in the emotion regulation 
mechanism and see whether this predicts subsequent change in life satisfaction. However, 
this presupposes the time scale over which change in therapy is supposed to occur (i.e. an 
early change in mechanism leads to a later change in outcome) and this pattern may vary 
from individual to individual. There are currently very few studies in the psychological 
therapies outcome literature that have been fully able to meet the criteria necessary to 
establish mediation beyond doubt because of these challenges.  
The study by Garland and colleagues demonstrates another way to examine the 
mechanisms of action of an active treatment (Garland, Kiken, Faurot, Palsson, & Gaylord, 
2016). They examine the impact of mindfulness-based practice on eudemonic wellbeing, 
measuring all constructs weekly during the course of treatment to enable time lagged 
analyses (whether mechanism at time n predicts outcome at time n plus one and vice versa). 
The study demonstrates that state mindfulness and positive appraisal (making positive sense 
of challenging events) work together in an upward spiral to build eudemonic wellbeing. As 
the authors acknowledge, an important next step is to attempt to simultaneously examine the 
upward spiral between state mindfulness and both hedemonic and eudemonic measures of 
wellbeing, given increasing evidence that mindfulness also increases positive emotion 
experience (Geschwind et al., 2010). Taking weekly mechanism measures makes it possible 
to test potential mediating effects of a treatment more robustly, although does increase the 
testing burden on participants and it will not be possible to measure every possible mediating 
mechanism in such a fine grained way. 
Vanderlind and colleagues examine what underlying psychological mechanisms may 
prevent depressed individuals being able to repair negative affect via the recall of positive 
autobiographical memories (Vanderlind, Stanton, Weinbrecht, Velkoff & Joormann, 2016). 
Participants were asked to undergo a negative mood induction and then to try and repair the 
negative mood generated by recalling a positive personal memory. Those individuals who 
reported a greater trait tendency to be afraid of positive emotion experience (for example, that 
feeling good would make them lose control), were less able to increase positive mood and 
decrease positive mood during the memory recall. Had fear of positive affect been measured 
using a state rather than trait scale, it is conceivable that this relationship would have been 
even stronger. While this study did not use a clinical sample and there was a limited spread of 
depression severity, there was some support for the theory that fear of positive affect 
mediated the relationship between depression severity and a reduced capacity to repair 
negative mood via positive memory recall. This study builds on an emerging literature 
linking fear of positive affect (and related constructs like the utilisation of dampening 
appraisals to inhibit positive affect) to both anhedonia and depression. For example, fear of 
positive affect and dampening appraisals have been associated with anhedonia in cross-
sectional studies (Werner-Seidler et al., 2013). Moreover, manipulating the use of dampening 
appraisals has recently been shown to lead to drops in positive affect and increases in 
negative affect during positive memory recall (Burr et al., submitted). Arguably, fear of 
positive affect is now a strong candidate mechanism driving anhedonia to target in clinical 
interventions. 
There is now reasonably convincing evidence that the tendency to engage in an 
experiential mode of processing (characterized by attending to sensory and bodily 
experience) is associated with increased positive affect. For example, imagining scenarios in 
the mind’s eye as opposed to thinking about them verbally enhances positive affective 
experience in laboratory studies (Holmes, Lang, & Shah, 2009). Similar results have also 
been found when inducing an experiential processing mode prior to recalling a positive 
autobiographical memory (Gadeikis et al., submitted). Moreover, clinical trials demonstrate 
that imagery training can help repair anhedonia in the context of depression (see Holmes, 
Blackwell, Burnett Heyes, Renner & Raes, 2016 for a review). The study in the special 
edition by Renner and colleagues further extends this literature by showing that imagery 
makes individuals more likely to engage in subsequent positive activities (Renner, Ji, Pictet, 
Holmes & Blackwell, 2016). Conducting a secondary analysis of the Oxygen imagery trial 
(Blackwell et al., 2015), they found that individuals in the imagery condition showed a faster 
increase in levels of behavioural activation compared to those in the non-imagery active 
control condition. This is remarkable given that the imagery training (resolving ambiguous 
everyday scenarios in a positive direction) did not specifically ask individuals to engage in 
imagery about positive activities coming up for them in the near future. A logical next step is 
to see if asking individuals to imagine scheduled activities in the next week enhances their 
likelihood of engaging with them. It would also be interesting to see whether this increase in 
behavioural activation in part accounts for why imagery training leads to a reduction in 
anhedonia (cf. Blackwell et al., 2015).   
 In summary, articles in this special edition garner further evidence that positive 
phenomena can be cultivated in a variety of ways, including via cultivating experiential 
processing, positive appraisal style and self-compassion and reducing fear of positive affect. 
Further clarifying which mechanisms influence positive phenomena is of key importance to 
this emerging field. Early positive psychology approaches were arguably mechanisms 
‘neutral’, focusing on how particular intervention techniques could boost positive mood and 
reduce psychopathology but not explicitly relating this back to an underlying theoretical 
framework as to how these benefits may come about. This limits the potential to identify the 
critical active ingredients of a positive therapeutic response and also makes it harder to 
determine which treatments work best for which individuals (the personalized medicine 
agenda; e.g. see DeRubeis et al., 2014).  
While studies such as those included in this special edition represent significant 
progress in this regard, it is important to acknowledge that this is an embryonic literature and 
no underlying mechanism has currently been fully supported. To ensure that positive 
psychology and wellbeing research is taken seriously by academics, clinicians, and policy 
makers, it is important that the bar for what counts as ‘good enough’ evidence for a 
mechanism is set high. The following criteria can be used to establish a mechanism as a 
strong candidate to be targeted in intervention. First, the mechanism should be cross-
sectionally associated with the outcome of interest. Second, the mechanism measured at time 
one should predict change in the outcome from time one to time in prospective designs. 
Third, manipulating the mechanisms in both tightly controlled laboratory conditions and 
more ecologically valid settings should change the outcome in the expected direction. Fourth, 
change in the mechanism should be related to improvements in the outcome in psychological 
therapies, ideally this being established using robust mediation designs that meet the criteria 
recommended by Kraemer and colleagues (Kraemer et al., 2002). Finally, given ongoing 
concerns about the lack of replicability of findings in psychology generally (see Open 
Science Collaboration, 2015), it is also important to demonstrate an effect more than once, 
ideally across different laboratories (to minimise any allegiance biases) and triangulating 
across different measures (to ensure that any effect is not simply an artefact of the specific 
method adopted).  At the present time, as far as I am aware, no mechanism in the positive 
psychology and wellbeing literature fully meets these criteria and it would be beneficial for 
the field to aim to make this happen.  
Characterizing how best to operationalize positive constructs 
The range of different ways that positivity is operationalized across the studies in this 
special edition is noteworthy. For example, to index behavioural activation, the Behavioural 
Activation for Depression Scale (BADS; Kanter et al., 2007) is used by Renner et al (2016). 
To measure positive mental health, Trompetter et al (2016) apply the Mental Health 
Continuum Short Form (MHC-SF; Keyes, 2002) – a composite index of emotional, 
psychological and social wellbeing. To index passion for a given activity, Rice & Fredrickson 
(2016) use the Passion Scale (Vallerand et al., 2003) to measure harmonious and obsessive 
passion. Jaziaieri et al (2016) measure life satisfaction using the Satisfaction with Life Scale 
(WSLS; Diener et al., 1985). The focus in the Vanderlind and colleague (2016) study is 
positive hedonic experience, measured using a single item happiness rating scale.  
In each case, these choices of measure seem appropriate and well considered. 
However, this proliferation of measures in the field presents challenges when trying to 
generalise across studies.  The constructs measured are likely to share common ground but 
also to differ in important ways. This makes it difficult to infer commonalities across studies 
and limits opportunity for meaningful replication. This problem has been stated most forcibly 
by Sally Davies (at the time the Chief Medical Officer of the UK): “it seems clear from the 
outset that ‘wellbeing’ means different things to different people. Each approach has inherent 
strengths and weaknesses, but one thing is obvious: there is no clear consensus in the best 
way to define and measure well-being within mental health.......use by researchers and policy 
makers of an array of validated, unvalidated, subjective and objective measurement 
approaches and ‘proxy scales’ of varying lengths and sophistication, it can become difficult 
to scientifically examine any single wellbeing perspective in a robust and consistent way .....” 
(p.36, Annual report of the Chief Medical Officer, 2013).  
This is a key challenge for the field, particularly in the face of some sceptical 
audiences who prefer a psychopathology lens and see positive focused approaches as ‘soft 
science’.  It would be useful to agree standard measures for the field to use and include these 
where appropriate in studies. Any measure that is selected needs to be well validated and 
ideally to have general population normative data. For example, a measure of reduced 
hedonic experience in the clinical domain could be the Snaith Hamilton Pleasure Scale 
(SHAPS; Snaith, Hamilton, Morley, Humayan, Hargreaves & Trigwell, 1995), which, it has 
been argued, is as close to a gold standard measure of anhedonia as currently exists (Rizvi, 
Pizzaglli, Sproule & Kennedy, 2016). As a broader measure of wellbeing (combining 
eudemonic and hedemonic wellbeing), the Warwick Edinburgh Mental Wellbeing Scale 
(WEMWEBS; Tennant et al., 2007) shows promise. 
In addition to agreeing standard measures of positive functioning and wellbeing, it is 
also useful for studies in the mental health domain to combine these measures with additional 
ones indexing psychopathology. This makes it possible to further examine the extent to which 
these are orthogonal constructs (as argued by Keyes et al., 2005) or whether they are at 
opposite ends of a continuum of functioning (as argued by Johnson & Woods, 2016 in this 
issue). In this regards, the study by Chaves and colleagues in the special edition is a good 
example, as it includes a diverse array of both positive and psychopathological measures 
(Chaves et al., 2016). 
This commentary will finish with some general remarks about how to increase the 
likelihood that science of this kind leads to direct practical application.  
  
The importance of co-design and an implementation science perspective 
It is critical for the positive emotion regulation field not to lose sight of the need for 
practical application of its findings. It has long been acknowledged that a disappointingly 
small proportion of basic science findings lead to the development of novel treatments or a 
change in healthcare practice (Grimshaw, Eccles, Lavis, Hill & Squires, 2012).  The Cooksey 
report in the UK identified two key gaps in the translational pipeline: a failure to translate 
basic science findings into the development of new health care products and the failure of 
effective health care products to be routinely implemented in standard practice (Cooksey, 
2006). This is in part driven by ‘funding gaps’ that exist. For example, there is relatively little 
funding to support researchers in the early development of an intervention that is necessary 
before it can be taken to clinical trial. It is also partly driven by a move towards ‘silo-isation’ 
and over specialisation. For example, individuals with an interest in both academic research 
and clinical practice are often forced by systemic pressures to focus on one over the other. 
This is unfortunate, as individuals who are still actively engaged in both research and health 
care delivery are likely to have a clearer vision about which basic science questions are 
important for the healthcare community and how to then translate the answers to these 
questions into practical change.  
 Even when research is translated, this is often a slow and torturous process – for 
example, it is estimated it takes around 17 years for something to move from bench to 
bedside (Morris, Wooding, & Grant, 2011). There is a danger that at the end of this process, 
the intervention is no longer fit for practice, as the health care context may have changed. For 
example, an intervention that may have been seen as affordable in a UK National Health 
Service before the global financial crisis, may no longer be affordable after this time. The 
challenge for positive psychology approaches is both to ensure translation happens and that 
this proceeds at a sufficient pace so that the end product still fits the context for which it was 
designed.  
 One key way to maximize the likelihood that positive psychology research moves 
across the full translational pipeline to influence health care delivery is routinely to engage in 
widespread stakeholder consultations. It is crucial that a positive clinical psychology 
intervention is acceptable to all key parties, potentially including the service-users who 
receive them, the clinicians who deliver them, and the mental health service commissioners 
that pay for them (in countries where there is a national mental health service model). It is 
noteworthy that none of the articles in this special edition explicitly mention these 
stakeholder perspectives. While many of these interventions and experiments are likely to 
have been influenced by these stakeholder views, it is likely to benefit the field to hold this at 
the front of the mind and to be explicit when writing findings up. These stakeholder views 
should ideally be consulted throughout the research pipeline, from basic science through 
intervention development to intervention implementation. There is a particular danger with 
positive clinical psychology approaches that they may come across as “Pollyanna-ish” (Dunn, 
2012) – in other words naively positive and too good to be true.  This could potentially lead 
to service-users disengaging from them and clinicians not wanting to deliver them. There 
may be cultural differences in how clients react to these interventions and it is important to 
take these into account when applying interventions in new contexts if there is desire to move 
to a cross-cultural positive clinical psychology (cf. Johnson & Wood, 2016). The intervention 
mapping framework – an approach pioneered in health psychology to aid the effective 
development and roll out of public health interventions – emphasises the importance of this 
co-design process and could be a useful guiding heuristic for the field to use (Bartholomew et 
al., 2016).  
 A critical issue in the uptake of positive clinical psychology interventions will also be 
their affordability. With an ageing population and an increasing array of expensive 
intervention approaches that can be used to manage chronic diseases, governments have to 
make hard decisions about how to ration health care. Interesting in this regard is the choice of 
delivery format in the various interventions reported in this special edition. For example, 
Chavez et al (2016) have developed a group positive intervention, which is likely to be more 
cost effective than individual therapy options. Renner et al (2016) report a secondary analysis 
of an internet delivered imagery training. After initial development costs have been 
accounted for, such approaches are likely to be highly cost-effective. There is little evidence 
of a reduction in clinical efficacy when moving from individual to group therapy (for 
example, Wergeland et al., 2014) or from face-to-face to internet delivered protocols 
(Andersson, Cuijpers, Carlbring, Riper & Hedman, 2014), so such approaches are 
increasingly attractive from an economic perspective. However, service-users continue to 
hold mixed views about the acceptability of e mental-health approaches (Musiat, Goldstone 
& Tarrier, 2014), so there may be high levels of refusal of treatment or drop out. This may 
change with the increasing familiarity with a digital world, particularly in younger service-
users. However, there is good evidence that some degree of support is needed to maximise 
the effects of these interventions, so a guided self help approach is more likely to be useful 
than a fully self-guided internet approach (Saddichha et al., 2014).  
Implementation science perspectives may also maximise the translation of positive 
findings. In particular, by thinking from the outset about the likely implementation of a novel 
positive intervention, this increases the chance that it will be widely adopted by potential 
users. For example, a helpful framework in this regard is Normalisation Process Theory 
(May, 2013), which discusses ways to ensure that a health care intervention becomes a 
routine part of clinical practice over the long term. In particular, it is helpful to think of the 
sense-making people do when first tasked with implementing a new practice, the relational 
work that is necessary to build and sustain a community of practice around a complex 
intervention, the operational work that helps individuals enact a set of practices, and the 
appraisal work that individuals do when evaluating the impacts of a set of practices on 
themselves and others.  
Conclusions 
This special edition has a range of interesting contributions that help characterize positive 
phenomena, explore how interrelated to negative phenomena they are, and identify 
psychological mechanisms underlying positive phenomena. These articles represent excellent 
examples of an emerging body of work on positive emotion regulation and its impact on 
psychopathology.  To ensure the ongoing growth of this burgeoning field and to help it make 
a meaningful practical difference, it will be beneficial to measure positive constructs more 
robustly, to increase the rigor with which underlying mechanisms driving positive 
phenomena are evaluated, and to adopt an implementation science perspective to ensure 
findings are carried into real world practice.  
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